Colombia's peace process

Colombia's peace process
Demob unhappy
Aug 2nd 2007 BOGOTÁFrom The Economist print edition
A precarious arrangement is at risk
TWO years ago President Álvaro Uribe promulgated a controversial law to regulate the demobilisation of some 31,000 members of the right-wing paramilitary groups who for years fought left-wing guerrillas by inflicting a reign of terror in the Colombian countryside. The law pardoned the rank-and-file fighters while offering reduced sentences to those charged with crimes against humanity—in return for their co-operation with investigators. Their assets were to be used to compensate victims. The official hope was that this offered an acceptable balance between the conflicting interests of justice, reparation and the achievement of peace with an undefeated outlaw army.
Yet two years on, nobody is satisfied. Rights groups say the law is a cloak for impunity. The paramilitary leaders complain that they were duped by promises of lenient treatment, since broken. Officials say peace has been sabotaged by the courts. Hundreds of former fighters are re-arming.



Universal dissatisfaction might suggest to some that the government has got the balance right—except that the whole precarious structure of the peace process now looks at risk of crashing down. Last month the Supreme Court ruled that the rank-and-file paramilitaries could not be considered to have committed (and thus be pardoned for) the political crime of sedition, as the law envisages.
The court's argument was that the paramilitaries did not rise against the state, but acted in complicity with some army officers and politicians to defend economic interests (such as those of drug-traffickers). So, it ruled, they engaged in a criminal conspiracy for which they cannot be pardoned or amnestied.
That may be legally true. But Mr Uribe accused the court of double standards in having considered in the past that the crimes of the left-wing guerrillas, which include the murder and kidnap of civilians as well as drug-trafficking, are political in nature. The jailed paramilitary leaders responded to the ruling by threatening to end collaboration with the authorities. They desisted only after the government sent Congress a new bill to grant them political status. But even if the bill is passed, it may well be knocked down by the courts.
Mr Uribe's critics say that this impasse reflects the improvised way in which the peace process has been conducted. Officials counter that the process was bound to be messy, and that its flaws can be corrected as it goes along. They point out that no other country has put so many people on trial while conflict continues.
Only 44 paramilitaries (out of a potential 3,000) have begun giving their courtroom confessions. Some 70,000 people have applied to be officially registered as victims. The attorney-general's office seems overwhelmed, and impatience among the victims is mounting.
When militia leaders began their confessions in December, throngs of victims packed into anterooms where they could watch the hearings through a live video feed. But as one leader after another recounted massacres and disappearances with no remorse, and blamed many crimes on long-dead leaders, disillusion has grown. “The truth that we were promised from all this is not coming forth,” says Iván Cepeda, who leads a national victims' organisation. Scores of victims have received death threats, and at least three have been murdered this year.
Whereas the government pays a stipend to the former fighters, the victims have yet to receive anything. Even so, the biggest fear is that more of the demobilised paramilitaries will return to arms and crime. The Supreme Court's decision could encourage that, says Gustavo Duncan, the author of a book on the paramilitaries. But he reckons that the jailed leaders have no choice but to stick with the process, not least because for some it is the only safeguard against extradition to the United States on drugs charges. For all its problems, the likelihood is that the peace process will stumble on.

Hostage, but to whom?

Hostage, but to whom?
Sep 6th 2007 BOGOTÁ AND CARACASFrom The Economist print edition
In inviting Hugo Chávez (left) to negotiate with the FARC guerrillas, Álvaro Uribe (right) has taken a big risk
AFP
IN HIS first term as Colombia's president, Álvaro Uribe set his face against any negotiation with the country's left-wing FARC guerrillas, arguing that they had to be militarily weakened before they might talk seriously about peace. In particular, he rejected the FARC's calls for a “humanitarian accord”, its Orwellian term for swapping the better-known of its kidnapped hostages for dozens of jailed mid-level guerrillas. But in a startling about-face, Mr Uribe has invited Hugo Chávez, the leftist president of neighbouring Venezuela, to try and broker a deal.
That is a sign of how much pressure Mr Uribe, whose father was murdered by the FARC in a botched kidnap, now faces on the issue. The FARC has held a number of hostages for up to ten years because it considers them canjeable (swappable). The 45 people still in that category include Ingrid Betancourt, a politician of dual Franco-Colombian nationality; several other politicians; army and police officers; and three Americans working under contract to the State Department.

Colombian public opinion has veered towards favouring a swap after the killing in June, in circumstances yet to be clarified, of 11 regional legislators held by the FARC for the past five years. A schoolteacher whose son is a hostage drew widespread public support by marching 1,000km (620 miles) to Bogotá to call for a swap. France's president, Nicolas Sarkozy, has made obtaining the release of Ms Betancourt a priority. At his behest, Mr Uribe in June freed Rodrigo Granda, the highest-ranking prisoner, who promptly decamped to Cuba.
Hitherto, the main sticking point has been the FARC's demand for the government to withdraw troops from an area where negotiations would take place—something most Colombians oppose. It is to break this deadlock that Mr Uribe turned to Mr Chávez. The two men are ideological opposites but have developed a relationship of wary mutual respect. Mr Chávez leapt with gusto at the chance to be seen as a regional powerbroker. In the past two weeks he has met Mr Uribe and spoken to the families of both the hostages and the guerrilla prisoners.
If anyone can persuade the FARC to deal, it is indeed Mr Chávez. Its leaders have already agreed to meet him in Caracas. It is not long ago that Colombian officials were publicly accusing him of supporting the guerrillas and turning a blind eye to their alleged bases across the border in Venezuela. Raúl Reyes, a FARC leader, gave indirect support to such claims in an interview with La Jornada, a Mexican newspaper, published this week, in which he said he had met Mr Chávez.
Mr Uribe's defenders have long argued that a hostage swap will merely encourage further kidnapping. The FARC was behind nearly a third of 23,144 kidnappings in Colombia between 1996 and 2006, according to País Libre, a group that helps the families of kidnap victims. But that objection has been undermined by the president's own success in weakening the FARC. In 1998 the guerrillas kidnapped 1,016 people; by last year that figure had fallen to 122.
The bigger risk is that by bringing in Mr Chávez, Mr Uribe has granted the FARC an avenue to international legitimacy. If that were the prelude to serious peace talks, so much the better. But Mr Chávez, an elected president but one who has ridden roughshod over his country's institutions, is hardly best placed to persuade the FARC to accept the rules of democracy.
For Mr Chávez, the unexpected role of peacemaker is a welcome break from a string of foreign-policy setbacks. His decision not to renew the broadcasting licence of an opposition television station, his plans to change the constitution to allow himself to be re-elected indefinitely, large-scale purchases of Russian arms and resistance in Brazil to his attempts to join the Mercosur trade block have all diminished his standing in the region.
His new role as mediator may also amplify his hitherto limited influence in Colombia—the main obstacle to his plans to turn his “Bolivarian revolution” into a pan-Andean project. After meeting Mr Uribe he released a group of Colombian paramilitaries arrested in 2004 on mysterious charges of plotting a coup in Venezuela. He also surprised people in both countries by saying he was anxious to resolve a long-standing territorial dispute with Colombia over the Gulf of Venezuela.
But the problem for Mr Chávez—and this might be Mr Uribe's calculation—could be that in the end the FARC may reckon that it has more to lose than gain by a deal. “The hostages are the only thing the FARC have that gets them heard internationally and gives them any importance domestically,” says Gerson Arias of Ideas para la Paz, a think-tank in Bogotá. Whatever the outcome, all three parties in the coming negotiations face risks, some of which may be unexpected.

A health check for local democracy

Colombia
Defying the gun
Oct 25th 2007 BOGOTÁFrom The Economist print edition
A health check for local democracy
LAST time Colombians voted for mayors and provincial governors, in 2003, some were offered little choice. In swathes of the Caribbean coastal region right-wing paramilitary groups imposed their own candidates, often by intimidating rivals into giving up, or killing those who resisted. Will the next lot of local polls, due on October 28th, be free and fair?
The signs are fairly promising. Take the department of Magdalena, on the north coast. The governor elected unopposed in 2003 is behind bars, charged with colluding with paramilitaries. This time voters can choose from six candidates spanning the political spectrum. In Colombia as a whole, there are 12% more candidates this time. True, in 11 municipalities (down from 25 last time) there is only one candidate. But a survey by El Tiempo, a newspaper, found that this owed more to local political tradition than intimidation.

In many areas, people are less scared than they were. That is in part a tribute to President Álvaro Uribe's “democratic security” policy. Some 31,000 paramilitaries have demobilised under a peace agreement. In addition, prosecutors and the courts have cracked down on ties between politicians and the paramilitaries (many of whom are also drug traffickers). Some 40 politicians, including national legislators (one of them Mr Uribe's cousin) as well as Magdalena's governor, are being prosecuted for such links.
Several of the small parties whose leaders face prosecution are fielding candidates, but some of these may have gone straight. There is “less armed pressure” in areas that were once paramilitary fiefs, according to Claudia López, a political scientist who has studied voting patterns in such areas.
Nevertheless, two dozen candidates have been killed in the run-up to the election. At least half were victims of the FARC, the main left-wing guerrilla group (which is also heavily involved in drugs). In the past the FARC banned voting in areas it controlled; the murders show it can no longer do so, says Ms López. In other areas there are worries about former paramilitaries having taken up arms again in criminal bands.
The opinion polls suggest a moderate left party may hang on to the capital, Bogotá, defeating Mr Uribe's candidate for mayor. But most of those who vote will do so according to local issues. Rather than a guide to the president's future prospects, the elections will be an indicator of the health of Colombia's democracy.

TÉRMINOS CLAVE

SOFTWARE: término genérico que se aplica a los componentes no físicos de un sistema informático que permiten a este ejecutar sus tareas.

PIRATERÍA: delito contra la propiedad física o intelectual.

OPEN SOURCE: Software libre (en inglés free software) es el software que, una vez obtenido, puede ser usado, copiado, estudiado, modificado y redistribuido libremente.

DERECHOS DE AUTOR: es un conjunto de normas y principios que regulan los derechos morales y patrimoniales que la ley concede a los autores (los derechos de autor), por el solo hecho de la creación de una obra literaria, artística, tecnológica o científica, tanto publicada o que todavía no se haya publicado.

LINUX: es la denominación de un sistema operativo tipo-Unix y el nombre de un núcleo. Es uno de los paradigmas más prominentes del software libre y del desarrollo del código abierto, cuyo código fuente está disponible públicamente, para que cualquier persona puede libremente usarlo, estudiarlo, redistribuirlo y, con los conocimientos informáticos adecuados, modificarlo

OPEN SOURCE

Personalmente pienso que el open source o código abierto no es tan bueno como nos lo quieren hacer ver, en parte comparto la opinión de Bill Gates que dice que este tipo de programas atentan contra el conocimiento y los derechos de propiedad y desanimando a los investigadores y reduciendo su iniciativa de crear nuevas empresas y de mejorar los software ya existentes, ya que los propietarios al verse desanimados al no tener la posibilidad de obtener beneficios de sus inventos se quedaran con los viejos y nos iremos atrasando lentamente.
Por otro lado, el open source que tiene por objetivo acercar linux al usuario común, aquel que no tiene profundos conocimientos en informática, pero necesita hacer uso de una computadora para el desarrollo diario de su trabajo y permite adaptar cada programa a las necesidades individuales de cada trabajo.

CIBERCULTURA

La película trata en su mayor parte de la defensa del software libre, que sus detractores califican como pirata. Ellos dicen que más que una tecnología es una filosofía y un modo de vida donde le dicen “no al precio, sí a la libertad”.
En todo el transcurso de la película aparecen los personajes más destacados del software libre defendiendo su filosofía y exponiendo sus experiencias con la consigna principal que el soporte del software propietario es un monopolio que su filosofía es el egoísmo.